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College in 1897 and heard Theodore
Roosevelt speak as Assistant Secretary
of the Navy; but for the future admiral,
the Naval War College became a much
more important aspect of his career.
In the early part of his career, William
Jr. served under William S. Sims in the
destroyer flotilla, along with Dudley
Knox and others. Knox may have been
the key to the younger Halsey’s assignment to the Office of Naval Intelligence
in 1920 and six months later as naval
attaché in Berlin, where he reported
extensively on German naval developments in the early years of the Weimar
Republic. In 1932–33, Captain Halsey Jr.
followed his father’s earlier example by
attending the Naval War College. One
of his classmates was another future
five-star admiral, Captain Ernest J. King.
Halsey and his wife lived in Jamestown
and commuted daily across the bay to
the College. Although no star student at
the Naval War College, he was initially
considered as a choice for the faculty.
After some false starts with other orders,
Halsey eventually went on in the next
year to the Army War College, then
located in Washington, DC, where
his classmates included Jonathan
Wainwright and a future Army five-star
general, Omar Bradley. Again he did not
distinguish himself academically, but his
time there gave him unusual perspective
as one of the very few to graduate from
both the Army and Naval War Colleges.
However, that may well have been
Washington’s way of putting him
in a holding pattern preparatory to
going on to the aviation positions that
Admirals Leahy and King had been
recommending for him. In 1934, Halsey
went to Pensacola for training as a flight
observer, but soon bent the rules of the
system to earn his pilot’s wings as the
oldest newly qualified naval aviator,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

Winter2019Review.indb 157

B O O K R E V I E WS

157

at the age of fifty-two. Thus, Halsey
cleared the way for a series of aircraft
carrier commands that eventually led
to his wartime career in the Pacific.
Hughes has researched Halsey’s wartime
career carefully and writes judiciously
and with great authority using his
extensive new research. Among many
interesting points, Hughes finds an
explanation for the mysterious skin
ailment that forced Halsey out of
commanding the Enterprise Task Force
just before the battle of Midway in
1942. While a fungal infection probably
caused dermatitis, it likely was related
to a bacterial infection in five of his
teeth, all of which Dr. Warren Vaughan,
a noted dermatologist from Richmond,
Virginia, brought under control in
early 1943 so that Halsey could return
to command in the Pacific theater.
Controversies about Halsey as a combat
commander undoubtedly will continue,
and Hughes’s excellent book will not be
the last word on the subject, but there is
no doubt that it should be the first book
on the subject that one should consult.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense
and American Strategy in Asia, by Ian Easton.
Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2017. 406
pages. $20.

Ian Easton examines and discusses
in fair detail the difficulties that the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) would face during an invasion
of Taiwan. He provides overall orders
of battle for both Taiwan and China;
explains which beaches on Taiwan are,
or are not, suitable for invasion; provides
monthly historical estimates of the
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weather with which an invasion likely
would have to contend; and describes
the defenses and policies Taiwan has
created to deter, or defeat, such an
invasion. Easton also describes, albeit
to a lesser degree, some of the aspects of
the Chinese bombardment and blockade
campaigns that likely would precede
or accompany an invasion of Taiwan.
The author builds a case that China’s
military is well aware of the many
problems and issues that would have
to be overcome if the PLA were to
invade Taiwan successfully, and that
Taiwan is well positioned, trained, and
equipped to repel such an effort. He
concludes that “Taiwan has little to fear
of invasion for right now” (p. 272).
A strength of the book is that the
author uses current and authoritative,
or at least well-situated, Chinese and
Taiwan sources in making his estimates.
Consequently, the bibliography is a
valuable resource for anyone devoted to
studying the military balance across the
Taiwan Strait. Also noteworthy is the
fact that the author of this volume works
at the 2049 Institute. Furthermore,
he acknowledges Mark Stokes as a
long-term mentor and thanks Randal
Shriver, until recently the 2049 Institute’s
director, for his leadership and support.
Stokes, of course, is as knowledgeable
about many aspects of the PLA as any
Westerner, and Shriver currently serves
as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Readers therefore can assume that the book
offers insights into some of the current
administration’s potential inclinations
regarding defense support to Taiwan. In
those important ways, the book is impressively informed and worth reading.
Despite those strengths, the author’s
sincere sympathy for Taiwan leads to a
tendency to overreach, which sometimes
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results in unsubstantiated assumptions.
For example, while demonstrating
that Taiwan will have ample strategic
warning of a Chinese invasion, he
asserts that in the immediate run-up to
an invasion “farm animals, especially
pigs, would be gathered in huge herds
to feed the troops” (p. 76). One wonders
why the invading forces would require
substantially more fresh pork than they
consumed beforehand. On the next page
he writes, “Shipyards would probably
be operating at breakneck speeds for at
least three months prior to the invasion,
working on 24 hour shifts and brightly
lit up at night. Light and noise travel
great distances over water, making them
easy to pickup with submarines and
surveillance ships.” That any such increases in noise and light could correlate
definitively to landing ship construction,
from miles offshore, and through a periscope, is at best doubtful. This tendency
toward inconsistent logic is repeated on
page 97, where he asserts, “China cannot
effectively blockade Taiwan without
bombarding it and Taiwan cannot be
bombed until it has been blockaded.”
Another example occurs on page 259,
when in a discussion of the perils of
mirror imaging he states, “It is too easy
to forget that reality and facts are things
that are arbitrary and subjective.” Better
editing would have helped this volume.
More significantly, the author’s bias for
Taiwan sometimes leads to dubious
conclusions. An example occurs when
the author states that “Taiwan’s spycatchers have discovered and arrested
traitors soon after China has recruited
them, ensuring that security breaches
were short lived” and that “experts point
out that Taiwan has done an extraordinary job in recruiting well-placed agents
in China who can provide early warning
information to the Presidential Office
(and the White House)” (p. 70). One
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hopes that Taiwan’s counterintelligence
efforts are indeed that good, but readers
probably recall that the John Walker spy
ring operated for over fifteen years in the
United States during the Cold War, causing enormous harm. Doubtless, Taiwan
works hard to catch spies—as did the
Federal Bureau of Investigation during
the Cold War—but it just does not
seem credible that Taiwan is immune
to effective Chinese espionage efforts.
Readers also might be forgiven for
doubting the author’s claim of Chinese
counterintelligence ineptitude if recent
reports in the press describing Beijing’s
destruction of Central Intelligence
Agency networks in China are accurate.
The perils inherent in the book’s
analytical tilt in favor of Taiwan extend
to other areas, perhaps most critically
to the author’s assessment (which relies
on some of his previous, similar work)
that the threat that China’s conventional
missile force and counterair systems
pose to Taiwan’s air force and navy is
manageable. This is important because
if this conclusion is wrong Taiwan’s
exposure to Chinese bombardment
and blockade, and even invasion, is
far higher than the author asserts.
This vulnerability—which depends on
whether Chinese long-range precision
strikes can be effective against Taiwan’s
defenses—will remain a critical factor
in Taiwan’s ability to deter or withstand
Chinese uses of force. The implications
of this competition extend far beyond
Taiwan. This work would be better
if it had addressed this issue more
thoroughly. Another subject that falls in
this category of insufficient treatment
is China’s ability to use its maritime
militia during an invasion of Taiwan.
Nonetheless, there is value in this
book. Its sources, and the author’s
background and experiences, provide a
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basis for optimism regarding Taiwan’s
ability to resist an invasion, which
the author relates enthusiastically.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY

Congress Buys a Navy: Politics, Economics, and
the Rise of American Naval Power, 1881–1921, by
Paul E. Pedisich. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2016. 304 pages. $39.95.

The subject of Paul E. Pedisich’s newest
work, Congress Buys a Navy: Politics,
Economics, and the Rise of American
Naval Power, 1881–1921, is apparent
from its title. Pedisich proposes that it
was Congress—rather than the executive branch—that was most directly
responsible for funding and building
the U.S. Navy during this pivotal period.
This well-researched work considers
four decades of presidential actions,
congressional legislation, and USN
policy and their role in the buildup of
U.S. naval power and capabilities.
These four decades (1881–1921) are
in many ways the most important in
U.S. naval history and development,
spanning the aftermath of the Civil War
through the end of the First World War.
At the beginning of this period, Pedisich
demonstrates the relative feebleness of
the U.S. Navy in comparison with European naval powers, most notably Great
Britain. However, this study demonstrates how the efforts of nine presidents
and their cabinets, sixteen Secretaries
of the Navy, and innumerable members
of Congress were able to transform the
U.S. Navy from a neglected, presteel,
and defensively focused organization
into—in the aftermath of World War
I—the world’s premier naval power.
Pedisich’s study is notable for its focus
on the legislative branch’s central place
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